The public budgeting, that allows collecting revenues and performing expenditures for a certain period and provides effective legislative audit and supervision, has established itself within the constitutions. In this way, the power of the purse is guaranteed constitutionally. However beyond the power of the purse, new and modern guarantees should be planned into the constitutions due to the profound effects of the public budgets on the economic life. There is needed a constitutional budgeting, considers citizen choices, in behalf of minimizing negative effects of public budgeting on the economic life. In this article which is a study on the scale of the European Union (EU), regulations on the public budget in the member country constitutions are examined in the light of the modern budgeting principles and the fiscal constitution approach. In this context this article initially identifies theoretical framework and approaches relating to the budgeting principles and in parallel with the constitutionalism. In the sequel it explores the provisions for public budgeting into the constitutional arrangements of 26 EU countries. Finally it compares country practices, gives suggestions how optimum constitutional budgeting should be done based on the budgeting principles and constitutional order. This article aims to suggest the basic theoretical structure of optimum constitutional budgeting on the scale of EU from the perspective of budgeting principles and constitutional budgeting. The ultimate goal of the article is making suggestion relating to budgeting in the EU constitution making process, to provide instructive and interpretive a discussion base for both scientists and bureaucrats in the light of the EU macro analysis.