Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Kırıkkale Hukuk Mecmuası (Online), cilt.5, sa.2, ss.845-872, 2025 (Hakemli Dergi)
This study
examines the impact of the Presidential Government System, adopted in Türkiye
through the 2017 constitutional amendments, on the independence and autonomy of
regulatory and supervisory agencies (RSAs). The primary objective is to assess
how the structural and functional transformation introduced by the new system
has affected the ability of these institutions to make decisions free from
political influence.
Using
content analysis, the research conducts a comparative evaluation of eleven RSAs
based on key indicators such as administrative structure, appointment and
dismissal procedures, tenure security, relationships with the legislative and
executive branches, financial resources, and accountability mechanisms. The
findings reveal that although these agencies maintain a legal framework that
emphasizes independence, their de facto dependence on the executive has
intensified. In particular, centralized practices in appointments and budgetary
control have significantly weakened their institutional autonomy. This study
contributes to a deeper understanding of how the centralization of executive
power under the Presidential System has redefined the role and functioning of
RSAs. It highlights the tension between administrative efficiency and
democratic oversight, and questions the sustainability of institutional
independence in a politically consolidated governance model. By situating RSAs
within the broader context of the rule of law and good governance, the research
offers an original and critical perspective to the literature on public law and
administrative reform.
Keywords:
Presidential Government System, Regulatory and Supervisory Agencies,
Institutional Independence, Autonomy, Public Administration.